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BELIEF OR 'BELIEF': RUSH RHEES 

ON RELIGIOUS BELIEF LANGUAGE 

Todd R. Long-University ofRochester 

The recent book Rush Rhees on Religion and Philosophy contains a stimulating collection of writin~s by Rush Rhees on a variety of 
topics in the philosophy of religion. Comprising accounts of personal, 
religious and moral struggles, these essays provide a refreshing change 
from the often dry, overly technical approach to philosophy writing. 
Despite spanning more than thirty years, Rhees' s essays disclose a fairly 
consistent philosophy .of religion with a clear emphasis. Since he was 
Wittgenstein's student and long-time friend as well as a literary executor 
ofWittgenstein's writings, it is not surprising that Rhees's comments on 
the philosophy of religion reveal a distinctly Wittgensteinian approach, 
both in content and style. Moreover, Rhees's particular way of doing 
philosophy of religion seems, in retrospect, to have set the course that 
subsequent philosophy of religion of the Wittgensteinian type would 
take. 
Two themes, or methods, inform nearly the whole book: a 
concentrated focus on the "grammar" of religious statements and a 
selective reliance on verificationism. Although the latter may sound 
provocative since Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion can rightly be 
seen as a polemic against logical positivism, I will argue that Rhees's 
reliance on verificationism is important for his project. In this essay, I 
want to consider Rhees' s treatment of the sense of religious language, for 
it both exemplifies his approach to nearly all aspects of his philosophy of 
religion, and it discloses what I will argue is his chief failing: the 
distortion of Christian concepts on the basis of what he thinks ought to 
be deep about religion. In what follows I will ( 1) sumtnarise his contrast 
between how we come to have ordinary beliefs about the world versus 
how religious believers come to faith and belief in God; and (2) show 
that his treatments of the Christian beliefs in God and an afterlife distort 
what nearly all Christians take these beliefs to amount to? My goal will 
1 Rush Rhees (I 977) Rush Rhees on Religion and Philosophy Phillips, D.Z. (ed.) (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). In what follows all citations of Rhees's writings refer to 
essays included in the work mentioned above; therefore, for all subsequent citations I will 
list only an abbreviated title and page number(s) in the text. 
2 For the duration ofthis paper I will use exclusively Christian doctrines and beliefs as cases in 
point for my critique. I do this for two reasons: Christian doctrines are the examples that 
Rhees uses, and they are those that I feel qualified to comment on. Also, my critique of 
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be to dispute Rhees's claim that religious believers never refer to God, as 
well as the related claim that religious belief language is never assertive. 3 
Along the way I will provide critiques of what may seem to be marginal 
issues; however, each critique should shed some light on what Rhees is 
thinking, and it is my hope that by the end of the essay enough light will 
have been exposed to these matters that my final argument will be 
convincing.4 
Rhees on the role of religious language 
Rhees begins by arguing that the religious believer's concept ofGod does 
not come by way of natural theology. Even if, Rhees urges, we were to 
prove the existence of a necessary being and that everything else 
depended upon it, we would have no good reason to call that being God. 
Rhees supports his claim in typical Wittgensteinian fashion: think ofhow 
religious believers teach children what "God" means. They do not appeal 
to causes at all; rather, Rhees says, "When people teach children about 
God-it is more like teaching them the language", and this language has 
its characteristic expression in "praying, telling stories, singing hymns, 
and so on" ("Religion and philosophy", p.5). Religious teaching, he 
asserts, differs greatly from the sort of teaching we receive in other 
domains. It is not like the sort we might get from a chemist who helps us 
to understand more about, say, water. For, Rhees asks, what would 
"'learning more about God' be? Or ' adding to our knowledge of God'?" 
("Religion and philosophy", p.6). His point is that God is not the sort of 
thing that we can learn more about, because understanding God is not a 
matter ofdiscovery: 
Rhees is aimed at convmcmg mainstream Anglo-American philosophers, not 
Wittgensteinian fideists. 
3 I will be successful if I can show that Rhees's arguments do not establish his claims. I will 
not, however, provide a counter-analysis that establishes conclusively that religious 
believers do, in fact, refer to God and make assertions. I point the interested reader to other 
works that attempt to demonstrate those very claims: William Alston' s (1988) "Referring to 
God" provides an account of referring to God; Nicholas Wolterstorff, in his ( 1999) Divine 
Discourse, and Alvin Plantinga, in his Warranted Christian Belief, discuss assertions of 
religious beliefs. 
4 In the meantime I am quite aware that suspicions are likely to be aroused that questions are 
being begged both by Rhees and by me. I urge my reader to withhold such judgements until 
the entire argument has been digested. 
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No one comes to a deeper knowledge of God by making an investigation- say 
by experimenting in order to discover properties which are not ordinarily 
apparent. The chemist can tell me more about sugar because he has made 
investigations and made experiments. He can tell us the results of these 
experiments and describe how they were produced. Ifhe said that he had found 
out something by revelation, that would not mfan much and it would not 
impress anyone ("Religion and philosophy", p.6). 
Rhees says that, although we could not discover anything new about 
God, we might "come to a deeper knowledge of God ..." ("Religion and 
philosophy", p.6). He thinks that a person who says she has a deeper 
knowledge ofGod than she used to would be like a musician who takes a 
way of playing a piece of music as the correct one; there would be no 
explanation for this in terms of reasons. Let us think about this idea for a 
moment. The claim is that gaining a deeper knowledge of God just 
amounts to taking something about God to be correct. Rhees uses this 
notion to explain what a great variety of religious beliefs amount to: a 
religious person has a religious belief, not because of anything the person 
has discovered or learned, but because the person just sees the world in a 
religious way and is thus able to worship and pray. On this point Rhees 
seems to be following Wittgenstein' s account of how a certain way of 
seeing may strike you. Think of Wittgenstein's duck-rabbit example.6 
You see the duck, or the rabbit, or both at different times, or neither. 
There do not seem to be reasons why you see as you see. I think Rhees 
has something like this in mind when he says that the religious person 
simply sees something in religion, while the non-religious person just 
does not see anything in religion. 
Before I reply, let us remember that Rhees's focus here is on 
striking an absolute distinction ·between what we know on the basis of 
scientific experimentation and what we know in religion: in science we 
discover things by empirical investigation, but in religion we either see 
the world in a religious way or we do not. Either ·we see the duck or we 
don't. I don't think this explanation will do for two reasons. First, we 
might agree that having a religious belief is typically more like seeing in 
the sense of what you see in the duck-rabbit example than it is like 
believing a scientific hypothesis, but let us be clear that the duck-rabbit is 
an example of literal seeing, while religious faith is not a matter of 
literally seeing an image. Moreover, we might agree with Rhees that 
religious persons do not typically believe on the basis of scientific 
5 Although I do not have space here to elaborate, this view strikes me as incorrect, for it 
assumes that investigation, or discovery, is always a matter of scientific experiment. As I 
argue elsewhere (On Rush, pp.S-7), both one' s emotional understanding and one' s religious 
understanding involve discovery, but neither involves scientific experiment. 
6 See Wittgenstein (PI, llxi, p. l94). 
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inquiry, but this point does nothing to show that there is never any basis 
for their religious beliefs. Is it the case that all religious people cotne to 
religious belief just because they see something in religion? Are there 
never experiences, or reasons, or discoveries that lead a person to faith? 
Rhees would likely reply to my question by saying that such experiences, 
reasons, or discoveries are not the sorts of experiences, reasons, or 
discoveries of science. I, on the other hand, urge that people come to 
religious faith in bewilderingly various ways and based on a Wide range 
of experiences. How can we know beforehand precisely what will bring a 
person to religious faith? 
The real trouble comes, Rhees thinks, when people "want to say 
there is some reality corresponding to their religious beliefs . . . if they 
think of the reality corresponding in physics" ("Religion and 
philosophy", p.7). He says that the importance of religion is not a matter 
of believing in the existence of an object, for there would be no sense in 
worshipping an object: 
The trouble is that if moral judgements are vindicated by some reality 
corresponding in the way in which reality conesponds to physics, then they are 
· not important either. That would not give moral questions the kind of 
importance which in fact they have. And it is something the same with 
religion. Descartes asked whether there were any reality corresponding to his 
idea ofGod, as though he thought this were like asking whether there were any 
reality corresponding to his idea of a tree. But what is there religious about 
believing in the existence of an object, in that sense? Or in worshipping it? (If 
you believed the tree was a holy tree, there might be some reality in that-but 
that is not the reality of the tree as a physical object.) ("Religion and 
philosophy", p.7) 
Here Rhees is pointing out, among other things, that the mere belief that 
the being who is God exists is not the sort of belief that is properly called 
a religious belief. Belief in the mere existence of an object, he thinks, is 
not the sort of thing that religious people give their lives to. 
Two important ideas here need to be discussed. First, Rhees 
obviously thinks that he is denying something clear when he says that 
God's reality is not like the reality that corresponds in physics. However, 
few things in academia are less clear than the ontological status of the 
items in quantum physics. These items are too small to sense directly in 
any way. My point is that what reality amounts to in physics is not clear. 
The objects of physics are not just one sort of thing. The notions of 
' object' and 'existence' in contemporary physics often are nothing like 
what we mean when we talk about a tree as an object or as something 
that exists. For one thing, we do not discover the subatomic items of 
contemporary physics by looking (or pointing) at them. Since we are not 
clear about what reality . amounts to in physics, it is hard to see what 
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Rhees's distinction between reality in physics and reality in religion is 
supposed to show. 
Second, Rhees is arguing that the reason a religious value matters 
could never be the fact that something exists. Things get their 
significance, not from their mere existence, but from having ·a certain 
value. So, for Rhees, God is significant to believers (i.e., God is worthy 
of worship), not because God exists, but because believers view God as 
endowed with value. Something is right about this claim, but Rhees has 
failed to see something important: the objects of physics may not be 
valueless. Ifa thing itself is imbued with value, then the very existence of 
that thing obliges in us a response appropriate to things of value.7 So, if 
something is good, then the fact of its existence as a good thing obliges 
us to treat it as a good thing should be treated. Similarly, if something is 
divine, then the fact of its existence as a divine thing obliges us to 
worship it. According to Rhees, the reality of physical items is a matter 
of their existence, something that Rhees supposes that scientists can 
check. Forgetting for a moment my objection that scientists cannot just 
check to discover the existence of subatomic items, let us note that Rhees 
is assuming that the objects of physics are not imbued with value. But, a 
core religious belief is that the objects of creation are the work ofGod as 
creator, and if God is the creator of the universe, then the very existence 
of physical items in the world obliges us to treat them as things of value. 
Whatever we might think these considerations show about Rhees's strict 
contrast between reality in physics and reality in religion, we may at least 
conclude that it is problematic; that is, the distinction is not as 
efficacious in establishing Rhees's position as he makes it out to be. 
For a moment, however, let us grant Rhees' s view that the reality of 
items in religion is nothing at all like the reality of items in physics. 
What, then, does he have in mind that would explain in a positive way 
what reality amounts to in the case of religious belief? I want to take a 
stab at illustrating what ·Rhees has in mind here: God is like a fictional 
character in a novel.8 Just as from inside J.R.R. Tolkien's The Lord ofthe 
Rings no one will say that Gandalf is a fictional character (or, unreal), so 
also from within the context of Christian practice no one will say that 
God is fictional (or unreal). So from within the story we think of Gandalf 
as real, and from within Christian practice we think of God as real. 
However, just as from outside the story we would be confused to think 
that "Gandalf' refers to a person, so also from outside Christian practice 
we would be confused to think that "God" refers to a person. Inside 
Christian practice it makes perfect sense to speak of the ultimate reality 
of God, but outside of that practice talk of the reality of God misses the 
1 I owe this line of analysis to the comments of Catherine Osborne in personal 
correspondence. 
8 This idea was suggested to me by Nicholas Wolterstorffin conversation. 
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point entirely. God is like a fictional character.9 "Gandalf' and "God" 
each expresses a certain character, but neither picks out a person. In The 
Lord of the Rings one finds out who Gandalf is, but "Gandalf' does not 
pick something out. In the religious life one finds out who God is, but 
"God" does not pick something out. Thus, it is as confused to try to find 
God outside the practice of religion as it is to try to find Gandalf outside 
the novel. 
Religious belief language: reference and assertion 
There are at least two other important lessons that Rhees wants us to 
learn about religious language: (I) The term "God" expresses a religious 
idea-it is not a name that refers to an object; nor, as we shall see 
presently, does it refer to a being; and (II) Religious belief language is 
not assertive. Let us get clearer on Rhees 's claims by considering what he 
would have to say about two examples of religious belief language from 
the Nicene Creed-one that involves the word "God", and one that is 
about future events. 
NCl: 	 I believe in one God the Father Almighty; Maker of heaven 
and earth, and ofall things visible andinvisible. 
This appears to be a straightforward affirmation of belief that is intended 
to capture some of the same claims that the Bible expresses. 10 When the 
religious believer utters NCl, usually in the context of worship, the 
believer typically means a number of things by it. Certainly, as Rhees 
points out with vigour, the believer is making a confession that expresses 
more than the belief that God is responsible for causing, or creating, the 
universe. Nonetheless, I say that most believers . at least mean to be 
acknowledging that they believe that God, the divine person of the Bible, 
the God ofAbraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the one who appeared to Moses in 
the burning bush (pick any definite description you like from the Bible), 
caused the universe to come into being. This belief involves at least two 
elements: (1) "God" is taken by the believer to refer to a being, say, "the 
9 No doubt Rhees would want to add to my simile that God is like a very unusual character, 
and Rhees would want to emphasise the differences as well as the similarities. For instance, 
we cannot actually live in the novel, but we can actually live within the practice of religion. 
Nonetheless, I think my comparison is basically on-track in expressing what Rhees has in 
mind. 
10 I mean that the Bible contains stories in which God, a personal being, is attributed special 
divine characteristics such as omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience, and being creator of 
the universe. Here are some biblical references that suggest these attributes: Creator: 
Genesis 1.1, Nehemiah 9.6, Psalm 102.25, Acts 14.15, Hebrews 11.3~ Omnipotence: Job 
42.2, Psalm 115.3, Matthew 14.26, Luke 1.37; Omniscience: Job 26.6, 31.4, 34.21; Psalm 
147.5, Hebrews 4.13, I John 3.20; Omnipresence: Deuteronomy 4.39, Psalm 139.8, 
Proverbs 15.3, Isaiah 66.1, Jeremiah 23 .24, Acts 17.27. 
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being who saw that the creation was good", or "the being who delivered 
the Ten Commandments to Moses"~ (2) This very being, God, is the 
being who was responsible for the creation of the universe. 
In Rhees' s descriptions of what religious believers are doing when 
they engage in religious belief language, however, he denies that 
believers ever mean to acknowledge (1) and (2). According to Rhees, 
thinking that NCl, or some other expression similar to NCl, does 
function as a belief in (1) and (2) results from one's misunderstanding 
the sense of "believe" being employed there. To say something like NCl 
is never, even as a component of the utterance, to affirm an ontological 
commitment to the existence of God; for Rhees thinks that to claim that 
this is what one is doing is to make such religious language out to 
function as it might in the language-games of, for instance, astronomy. 
Astronomers make hypotheses and then test and verify them for 
accuracy. But a straightforward belief in the existence of a being who is 
God would not be the sort of belief that is capable of testing and 
verification. Rhees supposes this to show that the word "believe" in "I 
believe in God" cannot function in the same way as it does in an 
astronomer's statement "I believe in black holes". Therefore, Rhees 
thinks, the believer must be engaged in a different sort of language-game 
from those used in ordinary belief: 
There is a way in which language is used in religion-what we may call the 
grammar of religious language-which is different from other uses of 
language. This appears in connexion with certain expressions which are the 
same here and in language that is not religious, but which have a different 
grammar here. We use such expressions as 'understanding', 'teaching', 
'accepting', 'following', 'believing', 'asking', 'doubting', 'seeking', ... we use 
such expressions in the language of religion, and we use them outside religion. 
But they do not mean the same here and there. ("Religion, life", pp.l92-3). 
So how are religious expressions used differently from those same 
expressions used in ordinary ways? Rhees often says that religious belief 
language is much more like a value judgement than it is like an 
assertion.11 For instance, he writes of "The belief in a Creator-in awe 
and wonder. But it is also love and praise of the Creator. (It is not that I 
praise him because he is creator. To say 'Creator' is already praise.)" 
("Belief', p.SO). Rhees is saying that belief-utterances are themselves 
acts of religious devotion that presuppose a special religious way of 
valuing one's experience in the world. In worship, religious believers 
engage in various language-games such as prayer, praise, storytelling, 
singing, etc., but they do not thereby refer to a being that is God: 
11 For example, see Rhees ("Religion, life", p.189). See also Rhees ("Religion and language", 
p.42ff.) where he com.pares the language oflove to the language of religion. 
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Does this question (about the te1m "God") have any bearing on religious 
devotion-i.e. on the religion there has been in the lives of Hebrews and 
Christians who practised it? If you think there is some important confusion in 
the question-e.g. that it seems to have sense, because it is externally like a 
question that might be asked about "sulphur" or "air" or (?) "light", then how 
would you sort out the confusion.oftrying to ask this sort of question about the 
term "God". ("Remarks'\ pp.31-2) 
This question of how we would "sort out" what "God" means becomes a 
crucial component ofRhees's argument that "God" is not a referring term 
and that sentences that seem to assert something about God (e.g. "God 
exists"; and "God appeared to Moses in a burning bush") are not really 
assertive at all. Though Rhees makes this point many times, he lays all 
his cards on the table when he writes: 
"What is being said to exist?" We use "it exists" chiefly in connexion with 
physical objects, and anyway we use it where we can ask whether it exists or 
not. This goes with the sense of finding out whether it exists. Now the ' it', 
whatever it is, is something that we could identify in such an investigation­
by, for example, the methods by which we commonly identify a particular 
object. We might also confuse it with something else, or mistake something 
else for it. But in any case, the question whether it was the same object would 
involve those sorts of criteria. But the question whether we mean the same by 
"God", I have said, is not a question whether we are referring to the same 
object. The question whether we are still talking about God now . . . cannot be 
settled by referring to an object. And I do not think it would mean anything to 
ask "whether any such object exists" . Nor does it change anything if you say 
"being" instead of "object". 
"God exists" is not a statement of fact. You might say also that it is not in the 
indicative mood. It is a confession-or expression-of faith ("Religion and 
language", pp.48-49). 
Here we learn not only that God is not an object, but God is not a being 
either. Hold on a minute. I thought that God was the being in the Bible 
who created the universe and all that was in it, and that affirming this 
was entirely appropriate for the religious believer. What is Rhees up to 
here? Remember my illustration of Rhees's notion of God as being like a 
fictional character in a novel. If I were to say straightforwardly, "Gandalf 
exists", this would show deep confusion on my part. According to 
Rhees' s quote above, I would be confused because there would be no 
way of finding out whether Gandalf exists. I might, in my confusion, 
attempt to find out whether Gandalf exists, but I · would try in vain. It 
makes no sense to affirm Gandalf's existence outside the novel (uriless I 
do so metaphorically, but then I am not stating a straightforward belief). 
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Similarly, for Rhees, it makes no sense to affirm the existence of God 
outside religious worship, for God does not exist outside religious 
worship. 
Now we come to a crucial part ofRhees's argument. He claims that 
God cannot exist outside of religious worship because we cannot refer to 
God outside the context ofreligious worship. We cannot so refer to God, 
he thinks, because we cannot do an empirical investigation to discover 
whether or not God exists. This is what he means where he says, "We 
use 'it exists' chiefly in connexion with physical objects, and anyway we 
use it where we can ask whether it exists" ("Religion' and language", 
p.48). Rhees seems to have two reasons supporting his claim that "God" 
is not a referring expression. 12 One reason is that religious language­
games, even those that include "God", constitute the language of praise, 
confession, worship, etc.; they are not assertoric. 13 · 
One problem with Rhees' s argument that "God" is not a referring 
expression is that it assumes that we refer only when we make assertions, 
but surely this is not the case. When I ask, "Where is Old Mail).?", I refer 
to Old Main, but I do not assert anything. When I say, "Meet me at the 
Rush Rhees Library", I refer to the library, but I do not assert anything. 
As Nicholas W olterstorff says, "It may well be that when the religious 
person has occasion to say 'God exists', she is doing something other 
than, or at least something more than, making an assertion. From that it 
doesn't follow that she is not referring to God" ("Philosophy", p.l4). Not 
only does it not follow, but I urge that most believers take themselves to 
be referring to God when they utter NCl. Furthermore, if they were 
asked, "Do you believe God exists?", they would likely find this to be a 
perfectly intelligible question in which they took the questioner to be 
referring to God. And in answering "yes" to the question, they would 
take themselves to be referring to God (and to be asserting something). 
As Wolterstorff points out, it is question-begging to assume that all 
attempts to speak about God assertorically (other than talk about the 
"grammar" of a religious language-game) are misuses, for religious 
persons sometime speak about God assertorically,14 and they most 
12 The critique in this section owes. much to Nicholas Wolterstorff's critique of 
Wittgensteinian fideism, which also fits my specific critique of Rhees at this point. See 
Wolterstorff ("Philosophy'~, pp.IJ-5). 
13 This is, of course, a Wittgensteinian point. Wittgensteinian fideists have used it to combat 
the religious sceptic. If the religious believer never asserts anything with her religious 
language, then she cannot be contradicted by the sceptic. See Wittgenstein (Lectures, 
pp.53-9). . 
14 Religious assertions made by religious persons fill the contents of various Bible 
commentaries, Church confessions, catechisms, books, essays, pamphlets, especially in 
those documents that make up what is often called "Church Tradition". As Wolterstorff 
points out, if all such attempts to speak assertorically are misuses, then "thereby an 
enormous amount of what religious persons have said over the centuries is dismissed as 
improper" ("Philosophy", p.15). 
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certainly take themselves to be referring to God. Now, one might object 
that even though most religious believers would answer "yes" when 
asked if they use religious language assertorically, religious believers 
have not thereby established that they do, in fact, use such language 
assertorically. This is because what their beliefs are about will always be 
properly expressed by saying that their words do function assertorically. 
However, since religious believers will typically answer that they take 
some of their religious language to be assertoric and referential, even 
when they are aware of Rhees' s Wittgensteinian position about this 
issue,15 then unless Rhees can provide a satisfactory argument that 
establishes that religious persons never can refer to God, it will be more 
reasonable to accept what these religious people say they are doing than 
it will be to accept Rhees's assessment. I will return to this point later. 
A second reason Rhees offers for why "God" is not referential is 
that we cannot investigate to find out whether or not God exists. Rhees 
thinks that if we say "that God exists", this assertion falls within the 
language-games of science, in which case we ought to be able to verify 
the claim as we might verify that Pluto exists as a planet in our solar 
system. His argument is roughly this: Since we cannot verify whether or 
not God exists (God is not a physical object), the term "God" is not a 
referring expression. Since "God" is not a referring expression, sentences 
containing the term "God", even if they have the external form of actual 
assertive sentences, are not assertive. But this argument shows Rhees' s 
view to be a version of logical positivism. Unless we can point out what 
"God" refers to or investigate to find out whether or not God exists, we 
can never refer to God! Lest my reader should think I have mistaken 
Rhees or taken him out of context, let me add one excerpt from his essay 
"Religion and Language": 
What is being said to exist? If you are talking about an object, then if I and 
others understand what you are talking about, we can raise the question 
whether it still exists (whether the palace of Minos still exists or whether it has 
been destroyed now), or how long it has existed, and so on; even whether it 
has ever existed. This-the intelligibility of such questions-goes together 
with a general idea of what we could call finding out whether it exists or not. 
Suppose I have found out that as a matter of fact the palace of Minos does 
exist. But I do not think it means anything to say that someone might find out 
whether in fact God exists (p.4 7). 
There are two things to note here. First, if this is Rhees' s view, then he is 
guilty of inconsistency, since he often refers to items that do not meet his 
standard for what can be referential. He refers to rules, causes and 
15 For instance, consider the hundreds of professional philosophers who are members of the 
Society of Christian Philosophers, many of whom take themselves to speak assertorically 
about God, both in the context of worship and outside ofit. 
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numbers, but these items are not physical objects that can be pointed out 
or investigated by scientific means to find out whether or not they exist. 
Second, this quote shows once again that Rhees does not repudiate the 
positivist claim that only those things that can be verified can be said 
properly to exist; indeed, it shows that he embraces a version of 
verificationism in order to drive his own argument that religious belief 
language cannot be referential. I say, therefore, that his thesis is 
problematic, for it relies too heavily upon verificationism, a position that 
has been thoroughly discredited. I conclude that, on the basis of Rhees's 
argument, it does not follow that religious belief language cannot be 
referential-he has not established his claim. 
Now let us see how Rhees would deal with religious belief 
language from the Nicene Creed involving future events: 
NC2: 	 I look for the resurrection of the dead, and the life of the 
world to come. 
Like NCl, this seems also to be an affirmation of belief following from a 
biblical perspective. By this, I mean that NC2 seems to express a belief, 
perhaps gained in various ways but generally based upon biblical 
passages, that though humans die, death is not the end of them-they 
will live again. 16 Perhaps we can cast it along these lines: "Someday I 
will die; sometime after I die I will be resurrected like the stories I have 
~ead a.bout Je.sus in ~h.e Bible~17 there will be some sort of heavenly wor~d 
tn whtch I wtll parttctpate." 1 Of course, the person who utters NC2 wtll 
typically be doing more than simply acknowledging his belief that death 
will not be the end ofhim. As Rhees stresses, he may also be expressing 
his devotion to God for all of his life, including his hour of death. NC2 
may serve to orientate his life in a particularly religious way, and it may 
express a certain religious valuing of his life. However, none of these 
things prevents the worshipper from holding the belief that h~ will live 
again after his death. In fact, many religious believers not only believe 
that they will live again after their deaths, but they also take themselves 
to be acknowledging such a belief, as least as a component, when they 
utter NC2. 
However, according to Rhees, religious believers whose faith is 
deep never 	mean to express with their religious language the belief that 
they will live again after death. For if they did, Rhees says that they 
would be mistaking a belief "in the world to come" for an empirical 
prediction or hypothesis. He says plainly about the religious belief in an 
16 Some biblical passages that encourage such a belief include these: John 11 .25; I 
Thessalonians 4.16; Psalm 49.15; Daniel 12.2; John 5.28-29; Revelation 20.13 . 
17 Here are a few examples: Acts 3.15; Acts 10.40; Romans 10.9; 2 Timothy 2.8. 
18 Here are some passages that suggest as much: I Thessalonians 4. 17; 2 Corinthians 5 .1; 
Luke 13.29; Revelation 21.4; Revelation 22.5; John 14.2. 
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afterlife: "It has nothing to do with a belief that something is going to 
happen, or that something will last forever" ("Death", p.235). Why does 
he think this? First, prediction is one of the language-games in the 
domain of science. Scientists make predictions based on theories and 
then test their predictions for accuracy. But, Rhees thinks, we could not 
test the prediction that people live again after they die, at least not in the 
sense ofresurrection life. This is supposed to show that "believe~' in NC2 
does not function as "believe" does in science. Second, the belief that a 
person will live after death is not supposed by Rhees to be a religious 
idea at all. 
Rhees begins his essay "Death and immortality" with a discussion 
of the "grammar"19 of statements about "what will happen to me after I 
die".20 The main trouble arises, he thinks, when we talk about a person as 
immortal. Evidence of immortality should involve looking for signs of 
biological life, but the Christian does not ordinarily take immortality to 
be biological life just as it is here and now (hence the talk of transformed, 
resurrected bodies). However, the argument goes, if you try to think of a 
person abstracted from our physical life, which involves generation, 
flourishing, and perishing, then you raise the question of whether you are 
thinking of anything at all. So, the work to be done, Rhees thinks, is to 
show how a belief in immortality is different from a belief in a theory or a 
matter of fact. 
About the Christian belief in immortality, Rhees says that there is 
no sense in asking, "What is the truth about these matters?" because "the 
truth about these matters" has no meaning. He thinks it is wrongheaded 
to say, "We'll find out after we die", because this assumes 
that it is something that could be found out if only you get in the right position~ 
bringing it closer to scientific beliefs again ... It can't be just because we lack 
some data or some source of knowledge, and that we must wait patiently until 
these are supplied. The sort of thing that could be found out by experiment. 
("Death", p.214) 
So Rhees wants to guard against our thinking that religious beliefs could 
be in any way settled by scientific means. But my question is this: Which 
believers expect their religious beliefs ever to be settled by scientific 
experimentation? There are all sorts of ways I may come to feel 
confirmed about beliefs or decisions in my life, none of which are settled 
by scientific experiment. I want to say, "Of course, the Christian afterlife 
cannot be decided by experiment, for people don't usually die and then 
19 Rhees fol1ows Wittgenstein's notion that describing the grammar of an expression is a 
matter of describing how it can be used within the language-game to which it belongs; that 
is, describing the use ofthe expression. See Norman Malcolm (Wittgenstein, p.75ff.). 
20 Here I summarise some of the ideas Rhees discusses in "Death and immortality", pp.206­
15. 
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come back a few years later to confirm that there is an afterlife." Even if 
someone did come back to report that she had lived a resurrection life 
after her earthly life, this testimony would not be counted as scientific 
evidence, but do you think she would be in any way unconvinced? 
Rhees makes a more subtle claim meant to destroy the sense of any 
conception of immortality: "No experience you had after death could 
show you whether you are immortal or not: just that you had survived 
that one ... "("Death", p.214). Now we can see what Rhees is driving at: 
What is it that would guarantee, or demonstrate, or prove a person's 
belief, or prediction, concerning an afterlife?21 Rhees answers that 
nothing would, and therefore a person who says that some of her 
religious belief language is an acknowledgement of a belief about future 
happenings beyond the grave is either confused or she misunderstands 
what religious language is about. 
I have two things to say about this line of thinking. First, I want to 
ask: even if we assumed the resurrection life to consist of some sort of 
continuation of conscious experience (though we need not think of it this 
way), why should believers think that at the point of death their faith in 
God should end? That is, why should not believers expect trust in God to 
continue without any absolute guarantee? I sometimes feel confirmed that 
I have made a right decision in the past. Could this kind of confirming be 
settled by scientific experiment? Of course not. In a similar way, 
believers may come to feel confirmed by an afterlife experience, perhaps 
in a way far surpassing any earthly sense ofconfirmation, that they are on 
the right road, so to speak, without any guarantee involved. What 
characterises the Christian belief in the resurrection life is a matter of 
trust-specifically, trust in God's promises~ it is not a matter of scientific 
experimentation. My point here is that one may believe in an affirmative 
way that one will participate in a resurrection life without one's belief 
involving exactly the sort of belief involved in science. 
Second, Rhees would likely respond to my argument here by 
throwing the burden back on me to describe exactly what sort of future 
life beyond the grave I have in mind. In the absence of a good bit of 
detail, he would be likely to surmise that I really do not know what I am 
talking about. 22 I think this kind of question is important, but unless we 
are willing to abandon quite a few of our beliefs that we normally think 
of as warranted, or entitled, or as in some way epistemologically 
legitimate, then we must not think that somewhat vague religious beliefs 
21 Rhees makes his view explicit where he says, "What is it that is guaranteed; that that really 
happened; that so and so is going to happen? That something is to be found in such and 
such a place? That is not the reality which corresponds to religious beliefs. What is 
guaranteeing a religious belief? A guarantee is something you ought to be able to check; it 
should be borne out or not borne out" ("Belief', p.SO). 
22 Rhees says, for example, "Ifyou try to think of an individual as something abstracted from 
the process of generation and flourishing and perishing, then there is the question of 
whether you are thinking of anything at all" ("Death", p.209). 
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are illegitimate qua beliefs either. Consider the following situation: Little 
Fred's mother tells Fred that his father (who died before little Fred was 
born) left behind a huge sum of money for little Fred to claim when he is 
grown. Now let us suppose that, because of the way Fred's father set up 
the fund, Fred cannot legally check to determine whether or not he 
actually has the money coming to him, nor can he check to find out how 
much money is coming to him or exactly how old he will be when he is 
to receive the money. If little Fred tells one of his classmates, "I'm going 
to be rich when I'm grown", would there be anything wrong with Fred's 
belief? I think not. After all, Fred has never known his mother to tell him 
a lie. She seems perfectly reliable. Does anyone expect Fred to withhold 
all the beliefs he might have based on what his mother tells him until he 
has verified them all? What is interesting about this case is how little 
Fred knows: he does not know how much money he has coming to him, 
how he will get the money, where and when he will receive it, whether 
his mother will be alive when he receives it, etc. There are many details 
surrounding Fred's belief about which Fred is ignorant, and yet there 
seems to be nothing at all wrong with Fred's believing that sometime in 
the future he will receive a huge sum of money. I do not intend to use this 
example as an analogy for a religious belief about an afterlife (though 
there are parallels); rather, I want the example to point out that we can 
have legitimate (as well as true) beliefs about future happenings, even 
when the details surrounding those beliefs are vague, or even non­
existent. 
Religious language goes deep 
Following Wittgenstein, Rhees thinks that in order to understand 
religious language it is necessary to understand the connections between 
related concepts within the language-games of a religious form of life. 
However, I will argue in this section that Rhees does not follow his own 
principle, that his reluctance to connect certain Christian concepts to the 
traditional Christian belief in resurrection life results in a Christianity 
devoid of many of its fundamental concepts and is, thus, dubiously 
Christian. I want to show that this characteristic distortion follows from 
Rhees's unwarranted reducing of Christian belief to what he takes to be 
religiously deep. 
Rhees says he once asked Wittgenstein whether one could find a 
way to settle the issue between conflicting moralities, and Wittgenstein 
answered, "It is nothing I could do or dream of doing. I might say that 
one of these moralities was deeper than the other" (quoted in Rhees, 
''Election", p.249). This notion of depth seems to have greatly influenced 
Rhees's thinking about religious belief, for he uses the notion of depth in 
religion in a similar way to Wittgenstein's notion in morality. But Rhees 
leans harder on this idea of religious depth. When reading him one gets 
the strong sense that proper religious beliefs are always the deep ones, 
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whereas what he thinks of as shallow religious beliefs are more or less 
odd or confused qua religious beliefs. In fact, what he considers to be 
deep about religious belief seems to determine what he is willing to count 
as religious at all. 23 As I have shown earlier, for Rhees to allow Christian 
afterlife concepts to be thought of in any way as future happenings is, to 
his mind, to make them out to be scientific or pseudo-scientific claims, 
which he takes not to be religious at all. Expressing his doubt about 
immortality as implying future events, Rhees says that the ideas of 
liberation from sin and alienation from God are involved 
when the belief in immortality is expressed as belief in another sot1 of 
existence. And also, that they are patt of what is meant by speaking of the 
belief in immortality as hope. Is it a hope for something that is going to 
happen? . . . The belief in immmtality as hope. When this is expressed as a 
hope for something that is going to happen-and this seems to be the 
commoner form-it would be hard to say clearly what is expected, or in what 
sense it is expected to happen. ("Death", pp.221-2, bold added). 
I agree that it is hard for believers to say clearly what is expected to 
happen, but let us ask ourselves this question: Can we imagine Rhees 
allowing any description or explanation about such a future happening? It 
is not just that it would be hard to say clearly what is expected to 
happen-he utterly rules out this sort of talking because he thinks it 
brings religion too close to scientific inquiry. But note that he has 
admitted that Christian belief in immortality in the sense of future 
experiences beyond death is "the commoner form" of the belief. And I 
would argue that this has been the traditional Christian position. 24 But 
Rhees says that he can see nothing in this kind ofthinking: 
There is a side of Christianity which I do not understand at all. I mean what is 
said in the Scripture about the Second Coming of Jesus and about the 
transformation of the world which there will be then.-! do not understand the 
way in which this is important to those who say and accept it: how itis that 
this goes deep into the souls of those who say and believe it. What is the cry 
from the soul that we can somehow understand in this teaching? 
23 For instance, Rhees talks about members of The Bible College in Swansea who used 
language expressing what Rhees calls "a personal affection for Jesus". About their 
expressions, which included "meeting Jesus", Rhees says, "I could never understand any of 
this, but it never sounded like what I should normally call religion . . . I could not find 
anything in what they said that would suggest or lead on to: 'sanctus, sanctus, sanctus. 
Domine Deus ... "' ("Mescaline", p.340). 
24 Over the centuries various ideas about the Christian conception of afterlife have been 
expressed. However, my concern is not about any particular belie£: rather, I am concerned 
with the general Christian belief in a resurrection life beyond the grave. 
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I can see, though vaguely, something of how one comes to believe in a Last 
Judgement: as though this were part of the sense of the life I ought to lead, of 
what it is for me to fail as I do, and so on ... 
In a way this forms part of what Christians say when they speak of the Second 
Coming, I suppose. So they might say it ought not to be difficult for me to go 
on to the rest. But I just do not see what this "going on further" is 
("Difficulties", p.256, bold added). 
Rhees talks about how these ideas seem to be related to the idea of anew 
heaven and a new earth but that he doesn't understand what problems 
these ideas answer. He is further puzzled by the biblical talk about future 
events. He can only think of this talk as being "figurative language", but 
he says, "I am sure that to call this language 'figurative' shows a deep 
misunderstanding~ but I do not know how to avoid it" ("Difficulties", 
p.357). Further along he says this: 
What I do not understand is how one comes to the idea of a new world, which 
is part of the notion of Christ's Second Coming. Nor do I understand the 
importance for a believer that the Second Coming has. I do not doubt, of 
course, that it has great impmtance. I am saying only that I am blind.25 
("Difficulties", p.360) 
Why is Rhees blind? We might begin to understand how to take his 
admission of blindness by considering his question I quoted above: 
"What is the cry from the soul that we can somehow understand in this 
teaching?" He seems to think that only those things with which he 
intimately struggles, or which answer some deep personal problem, can 
be thought of as religiously deep. 26 He cannot see the Christian ideas of a 
future resurrection life, a future judgement day, and a future new heaven 
and new earth as being genuine religious ideas. For instance, about the 
belief in a new heaven and new earth, Rhees says, "But I do not know 
into what problems in the lives of believers this fits. I do not know which 
difficulties and attitudes of believers lead them to say and repeat these 
things as they are given in Scripture" ("Difficulties", 356). Similarly, he 
says, " . . . I do not understand what the belief in the Second Coming and 
in the Kingdom of Heaven on Earth 'does for people'" ("Difficulties", 
361 ). Whatever may prevent Rhees from understanding these concepts, it 
is clear that he thinks that Christian afterlife concepts that suggest future 
happenings are, at their best, very shallow as religious beliefs. 
25 Rhees concedes an even more radical blindness where he says, "Because I am blind to the 
conception of Church, and of dogma also, I remain outside-Catholic or Protestant" 
("Christianity", p.372). 
26 About these very issues he says, "I suppose my trouble is that I think too much ofmy own 
life and body and my own standing before Judgement" ("Difficulties", p.357). 
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However, I see no reason to think that the religious belief in a 
future afterlife need be shallow. With one example I would like to show 
how Christian concepts about an afterlife point toward a resolution of a 
very deep moral and religious problem. The problem I want to focus on is 
injustice. The Bible stresses that God is just, but we are all aware of 
shocking cases of injustice. Now, the problem of injustice is not much of 
a problem for me; as a middle-class Westerner I have lived a life of 
luxury far surpassing the vast majority of those who have lived before 
me. Not only that, but I have all sorts of resources to rebound from 
unfortunate circumstances and suffered harms. But, as Marjorie Suchocki 
puts it: 
What about those whose lives waste away in desperate poverty, starvation, and 
disease? What about maltreated children so psychologically damaged by 
atrocities that they never develop the capacity to love? Where is the 
redemption in this world from such evils? How is there justice for those 
victims who are permanently man·ed through the effects of evil, beyond the 
ministering aid of social agencies or caring individuals. For many victims, the 
evil of injustice is the final and ovetwhelming word ("Question", p.298). 
Now, if the Christian doctrines of atonement, judgement, redemption, 
and resurrection life are basically correct, and if God is just, as religious 
believers say God is, then we have good reason to hope that such 
shocking cases of injustice have a remedy. So my question is this: Is 
there not something very deep religious about the Christian concepts of a 
future redemption, resurrection life, and a new heaven and new earth, 
which taken together, point to a resolution of the terrible problem of 
injustice? Even if you are not religious, can you not see that these 
concepts, which are bound up with the notion of redemption, might be 
seen as very deep religiously? But Rhees says 
I have missed the importance of the resunection, in some way . . . The 
resurrection does not seem to me to add much. I know that this shows there is 
some big defect in my conception ofhis life, and even of his Passion ... I can 
·see, for instance, that the resunection gives a special force and importance to 
Jesus' promise of eternal life (and resunection of the body) to those who 
believe in him ... And I suppose this is connected, in some important way, 
with the idea of him as redeemer. If I could see that, I might see the 
significance more clearly than l do . . . As far as I can see, then, the resunection 
has its importance as part of the general idea of Christ as redeemer. I suppose 
that is in many ways the most important idea in Christianity. But it is one of 
which I can grasp at most only a certain fringe ("Difficulties", pp.348-9). 
Before, he pleaded blindness with respect to the depth of the Christian 
doctrines of resurrection life, a future judgement day, and a new heavens 
and earth; here Rhees pleads poor vision with respect to the very central 
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Christian doctrines of Christ's resurrection and redemption. Admitting 
that Christ's redemption is "the most important idea in Christianity", 
why has he failed to see the significance of these ideas for the believer? 
We cannot, of course, answer this question determinately; however, by 
connecting Rhees's admissions of blindness to our earlier discussion of 
his view of the function of religious language, we can develop an answer 
that is not only consistent for Rhees, but which is also fully in the spirit 
of his view that religious language is a special kind of expression or 
valuation. 
As we have seen, Rhees denies that religious language ever 
commits believers to the existence of non-physical objects or beings. 
Also, religious language is thought to be neither referential nor is it ever 
to be construed as anything like a fact about the past or a belief about a 
future happening. For Rhees, in as much as religious expressions have 
sense, their sense depends entirely upon the role they play in the lives of 
religious people. I think that Rhees is correct to point out the special role 
that religious belief language plays in the lives of believers. Surely 
believers do value life in a special, religious way. Surely religious 
language is expressive ofa distinctly religious picture of the world, and it 
sometimes functions itself as a particular valuing of the world. One of 
Rhees's great contributions to philosophy is his trailblazing work in 
bringing out the significance of religious language as expressive of a 
religious form of life. 
It seems to me, however, that his all-encompassing emphasis upon 
the role of religious language in the life of the believer comes at too great 
a price, for it threatens to take away from many believers what they think 
of as an indispensable feature of their religious belief. I urge that it is just 
false that most Christians through the centuries have not believed in the 
existence of God; it is also false that most Christians have not believed 
that Jesus, though he died, lives. It is false that most Christians have not 
believed that they would take part in a future last judgement and a 
resurrection life. Moreover, it is false that Christian believers have not 
taken their religious language to refer to God and to future events such as 
a resurrection life. It seems strange to have to argue for this. Go to almost 
any Christian church and ask the parishioners there if they believe they 
refer to a being who is God with their religious language. Look at the 
historical documents of the Church, and there you will find, over and 
over, expressions that are meant to be referential and assertoric. Consider 
the multitudes of Christians who have fought and died for their beliefs, 
the missionaries who have risked their lives (and often lost them), not 
because they thought it was of the utmost importance to have a deep, 
religious attitude to life, but because they actually believed in the 
existence of God to whom they believed they owed their very lives and 
from whom they believed they had received a command to spread the 
word. · 
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Rhees admits that there are religious people who believe this way, 
but he considers this sort ofbelief either to be very shallow religiously or 
not religious at all. His failure to see the depth of religious ideas such as 
the atonement, redemption, and resurrection life, is due in part, I submit, 
to his commitment to the view that the language expressing those 
doctrines cannot refer to a being who is God, on the ground that if such 
language did refer to a being who is God, then we could never make an 
investigation that would guarantee that what we were referring to was the 
being who is God. 
Rhees' s move in spelling out what is deep about Christianity is to 
follow Simone Weil in thinking of religious concepts as being under the 
umbrella of eternity. Rhees says, "The belief that I may see my father 
again beyond the grave is not particularly religious. Religjous beliefs 
centre rather on the notion of eternity ... " ("Death", p.211 ). 7 If what is 
deep about religion is seen from the standpoint of the eternal (in Weil's 
sense), then questions about future happenings beyond the grave do 
begin to sound silly. But, as I have shown, we need not think there is 
anything silly, or shallow, about the several Christian doctrines relating 
to the resurrection life; on the contrary, these doctrines taken together 
provide a deep answer to a deep religious problem. What is most 
troubling to me is that, given this particular interpretation of religious 
concepts seen under the eternal, many concepts I take to be crucial to 
Christianity are seen to be so unimportant that they can be abandoned.28 
It is revealing how often Rhees refers to or quotes W eil, and it is also 
revealing what he says abmJ.t her: "Simone Weil could see little religious 
significance in the resurrection of Christ, neither does she seem to have 
found any sense or value in the idea of the resurrection of the body of 
each believer" ("That man", p.261 ). Elsewhere he says that Weil "did not 
think the Resurrection important in the Gospels . . . she seemed sorry that 
it was included in the account" ("Mescaline", p.342). At another point, 
Rhees says he was reminded "strongly of how far she was from what one 
would normally take to be the Christian position . . . She was far away 
from the Christian position" ("Christianity", p.371). 
Assessment and counter-arguments 
To begin to see how far Rhees is from understanding the Christian 
position, let us begin where he comments approvingly ofWittgenstein: 
27 What an odd thing to say. As Mario von der Ruhr mentioned to me in personal 
correspondence, what could be more natural than the desire to be joined to the objects of 
our love for eternity? If it makes sense to speak ofeternal life in the presence ofChrist, then 
it should a)so make sense to speak ofeternal life in the presence ofour neighbours. 
28 This is especially puzzling to me because, as I will say with more force later in the essay, · 
Rhees says that he just wants to describe religious language-not critique it. 
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He would not have said that he believed in a Judgement after death. But he did 
say ... that he understood how such an idea or belief comes to be important in 
a man's reflexion on his life and his sense of responsibility: that some day one 
will have to answer for it, that one will appear before God "in a queer kind of 
body" (a glorified body) and be judged ("Election", p.244). 
Note that the sort of belief about a judgement after death that is being 
recommended here has nothing at all to do with an actual judgement after 
death; rather, the belief makes sense to Wittgenstein, and to Rhees, only 
because it engenders reflection upon one's life. I agree that the belief in a 
judgement after death engenders reflection upon one's life, but I also 
think the belief often involves thinking that there will be a real judgement 
after death. The kind of belief expressed in the quote above amounts to a 
sort of picture that serves to help you to regulate your actions now; that 
is, for Wittgenstein and Rhees, a belief in "a Judgement after death" 
serves as a guide for moral and reiigious action. I agree that such a belief 
does serve this purpose, but the believer also sees the concept of 
judgement day as bound up with other Christian concepts such as 
redemption, resurrection, and the new heavens and earth, and the New 
Testament writers clearly refer to these as being accomplished beyond 
this earthly life. Moreover, believers typically see the question of whether 
there is a being who is God to pray to and to praise, or whether there will 
be an afterlife, etc., as crucially important with respect to whether they 
ought to continue to participate in religious practices. Wolterstorff points 
out that if the Wittgensteinian analysis ofreligious language seemed right 
to many religious believers, this would be a good reason to discard their 
religion: 
For example, fundamental to Christianity is the belief that we humans need to 
be saved from what fundamentally ails us; and that we cannot save ourselves 
but must be saved by God. Suppose one adopted the view that "God" is not a 
referring expression and that sincere participation in a religious form of life, 
even a theistically religious fmm of life, is devoid of commitment to the 
existence of a being which is God. For many people, their believing that would 
be seen by them as a reason for concluding that language about our needing to 
be saved by God is deeply inappropriate (Wolterstorff, "Philosophy", p.18). 
I believe that Wolterstorff has here characterised properly the connection 
for most participants in salvation religions between the practice of 
engaging in religious language-games and the belief, e.g. , that "God" 
refers to a being who is God. It is, of course, impossible to say generally 
what happens in each case. Perhaps in many cases the belief and the 
practice go hand-in-hand. In other cases, it may be that the belief is in the 
practice. In others, the belief may ground the practice. Regardless of the 
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various possible ways that beliefs and practices are connected, the point I 
am trying to make is this: For many believers, their belief in God is such 
that if they were to come to think that God does not exist, then this would 
be a reason to stop engaging in religious practices. There are examples of 
this. For instance, consider parents whose child has developed cancer. 
The parents believe in God. They have learned through religious 
instruction that God is merciful and that God answers prayers. The 
parents pray regularly that God will heal their child, but the child dies. 
The parents come to believe that God does not exist, because they cannot 
believe that a merciful deity would allow their precious, innocent child to 
die, especially after they have agonised for months in prayer, petitioning 
God with many tears to save their child's life.29 Now, perhaps there are 
religious answers for why God does not always answer prayers as we 
would like them to be answered, but even so, we have here an example of 
former religious believers who become atheists because they do not think 
that God exists.30 Also, if I may judge by what many Christians have told 
me, some religious believers have occasional doubts · about whether God 
exists. Perhaps they have heard a compelling argument concluding that 
God does not exist. Perhaps certain life experiences have caused them to 
doubt whether God is there after all. In many such cases, the crisis 
involved is not just an emotional or philosophical one-the crisis may be 
acutely religious. Whether or not they will continue as religious 
practitioners hangs on a satisfactory answer to the question. We can put 
this point positively by saying tha( for many believers, participation in 
religious practices presupposes an ontological commitment to a being 
who is God.31 I do not mean to suggest that I am right but Rhees is 
wrong~ rather, my claim is that Rhees's explanation for the connection 
between religious belief and religious practice is too narrow-it leaves 
too many cases out. 
It will be helpful to contrast Wolterstorff' s characterisation of 
salvation (above) with Rhees' s comment: "Is the conception of 
'salvation' something like saving us from a terrible predicament? It may 
be hard for us to think of it otherwise-and yet that idea has hardly 
anything to do with religion" ("Religion", p.203). Hardly anything to do 
29 Sometimes in such cases the parents become angry with God rather than disbelieve in God. 
They may refrain from participating in religious practices for a while but later return to 
them. 
30 There may be more to their new-found atheism than I have mentioned here. I only mean to 
point out that the belief that God does not exist may play an important role in their 
becoming atheists. 
31 Throughout this essay I have referred to "the being who is God" in order to distinguish 
what I think religious believers typically believe when they use the word "God" from what 
Rhees suggests that believers mean by it. My phrase is meant to say the following : God is a 
being whose attributes include most of the great-making characteristics traditionally 
attributed to God. God is thus, among other things, personal, omniscient, omnipotent, 
omnibenevolent, creator, omnipresent, everlasting (or, eternal). 
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with religion! Most Christians would say that the human predicament 
due to sin is the very reason that God became incarnate-to save us from 
our terrible predicament. This is the sense that salvation has. It is 
connected both internally and externally to the Christian notions of sin, 
incarnation, atonement, and redemption. If we are not in a terrible 
predicament, then salvation, as the religious person means it, loses its 
sense. 
Since this is the sense of salvation for most religious believers of 
the type Rhees discusses (i.e. Christians), what are we to make of his 
claims: "You can only describe religious worship and practices" 
("Difficulties of belief', p.l46), and "the philosopher's business [is] to 
try to help the believer to understand what it is that he is doing and 
saying~ not to interpret it ... '' ("Remarks", p.30)? These are echoes of 
Wittgenstein's claim that the task of philosophy is merely to describe the 
uses of words that express concepts, that "philosophy leaves everything 
as it is".32 Let us assume that Rhees is merely describing what religious 
believers are doing when they use religious language. If religious 
believers accept Rhees' s description of religious language, then as we 
have seen, for a great many of them, this would constitute a good reason 
for them to reject their religious form of life. But Rhees says that he is 
not in the business of critique-he is only in the business of description. 
It seems to me that if Rhees wants merely to describe what believers are 
doing in their practices, he ought to say that religious believers 
sometimes take themselves to be referring to God and sometimes to be 
making assertions in their various language-games. 
Rhees' s writings on these matters were, of course, directed at the 
logical positivists who were arguing that moral, aesthetic and theological 
sentences were meaningless on the ground that the only kind of meaning 
worth its salt was cognitive meaning. In an attempt to demonstrate the 
meaningfulness of religious, moral, and aesthetic language, Rhees 
followed Wittgenstein in showing that there are important kinds of 
meaning other than cognitive meaning. However (and this is important), 
Rhees accepted the positivist idea that religious language is not 
cognitively meaningful. Indeed, he staked his claim on the view that 
religious language is not referential because it is not assertoric and also 
because we cannot do an investigation to find out whether God exists. I 
have argued that, on the basis of Rhees's arguments, we have no good 
reason to accept his conclusion. My claim here gains even more force 
when we take into account Rhees' s self-acknowledged blindness to the 
sense of core Christian doctrines. If he does not understand the sense of 
some of the core doctrines of Christianity, ·how can he know that none of 
them is referential or assertoric? 
As I see it, this is how things stand: Given Rhees's failure to 
establish his conclusion, given his self-proclaimed blindness with respect 
32 See Wittgenstein (PI, 3124, 49e). 
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to what he himself acknowledges are core Christian beliefs, and given his 
insistence that the philosopher of religion's business is to "try to help the 
believer to understand what it is that he is doing and saying; not to 
interpret it"("Remarks", p.30), I urge that since many religious believers 
say that they take themselves sometimes to refer to God and to · make 
assertions, even when they understand well the philosophical positions 
involved, it is not only more charitable but also more reasonable to accept 
what these religious people say they are doing than it is to accept what 
amounts to a revisionist account of religious belief language. 
Finally, we should note that there is another way to understand this 
dispute. It may be that when Rhees and his fellow Wittgensteinian 
fideists use religious language, they do not, in fact, use it referentially or 
assertorically. There are various ways in which we may use a bit of 
language, and it is certainly open to Rheesians always to use religious 
language as Rhees says it is used. On the other hand, it may be that when 
other religious believers use such language, they do sometimes use it 
referentially and assertorically. I am such a person who claims sometimes 
to use religious language referentially and assertorically, and I know 
many other religious believers who make the same claim. If I were to 
become convinced that there is no being that is God to whom I refer 
when I use some of my religious language, then I would stop engaging in 
religious language games~ and so I think it is for many religious 
believers. So, another way to treat this dispute is to understand each side 
as providing a legitimate description of how religious language is used. If 
this is the case, then an appropriate account, or description, of the uses of 
religious language would be broader than Rhees allows~ thus, my 
position still comes out better than his, for I acknowledge many of 
Rhees's insights about the role of religious language in people's lives, 
but he suggests that his description of religious language as 
fundamentally non-referential and non-assertoric captures all the deep 
uses of religious language. Thus, his description of religious language 
use precludes my description. I can once again employ my familiar 
argument on the present supposition: Since Rhees sees his project as 
non-revisionist, if both his and my descriptions are legitimate, he ought 
· to include in his description what 1nany religious believers would claim 
they are sometimes doing with their religious language, namely, referring 
and asserting. To fail to do so would be to mis-describe a component of 
some religious belief language for some religious believers.33 
33 Many thanks to the following people who·-read and offered advice on various drafts of this 
essay: Edward Minar, Catherine Osborne, D.Z. Phillips, Thomas Senor, Mario von der 
Ruhr, and Nicholas Wolterstorff 
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